The Reverse Talmud Rule for Bankruptcy Problems by Brink, J.R. van den et al.
TI 2008-026/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
The Reverse Talmud Rule for 
Bankruptcy Problems 
 René van den Brink1 
Yukihiko Funaki2 
Gerard van der Laan1 
 
1 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute; 
2 School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University; 
 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
 
Weak Exemption, Weak Exclusion, and a
characterization of the Reverse Talmud rule for
bankruptcy problems
Rene van den Brink∗ Yukihiko Funaki† Gerard van der Laan‡
March 19, 2008
∗Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105,
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, e-mail: jrbrink@feweb.vu.nl.
†Department of Economics, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University,
1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-Ku, Tokyo, 169-8050 Japan. E-mail: funaki@waseda.jp.
‡Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105,
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, e-mail: glaan@feweb.vu.nl.
Abstract
Although the principles of Exclusion and Exemption are appealing, the specific condi-
tions under which an agent receives its claim, respectively nothing, seem arbitrary and are
inconsistent in the sense that there is no bankruptcy rule that satisfies both. However,
weakening these conditions (by putting lower boundaries on what is considered to be a
‘small claim’), there do exist rules satisfying both principles. In this paper we consider a
Weak Exemption and a Weak Exclusion property such that there is a unique bankruptcy
rule that satisfies these two properties, together with Consistency and Weak Proportion-
ality (i.e. a change in the estate effects the payoffs of agents with bigger claims more than
the payoffs of agents with smaller claims). This rule turns out to be the Reverse Talmud
rule. Moreover, we show that Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion are each others dual,
and that the Reverse Talmud rule also can be characterized as the unique Self-Dual solu-
tion that satisfies Consistency, Weak Proportionality and either Weak Exemption or Weak
Exclusion. Finally, we generalize the Reverse Talmud rule to a class of bankruptcy rules
that all satisfy some Weak Exemption and some Weak Exclusion property (that are not
necessarily each others dual), which also contains the famous Constrained Equal Awards
and Constrained Equal Losses rules as extreme cases.
Keywords: Bankruptcy problem, Exemption, Exclusion, Self-Duality, Reverse Talmud
rule.
JEL code: D63.
1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental models in economic theory is that of the bankruptcy or
rationing problem. This problem considers a set of agents that each have a certain non-
negative claim on a nonnegative estate such that the sum of the claims is smaller than the
estate. The estate consists of a given amount of a single (perfectly divisible) good. The
allocation problem then is how to divide the estate among the agents taking into account
their claims. This bankruptcy problem models real life situations. Basic properties of an
allocation rule is that all agents earn a nonnegative part of the estate and no agent gets
more than its claim. An allocation rule that satisfies these two basic properties is called a
bankruptcy rule.
The literature discusses many solutions (i.e. bankruptcy rules) to this problem,
see e.g. Young (1987, 1988), Chun (1988), Dagan (1996), Herrero et al. (1999), Herrero
and Villar (2001) and Thomson (2008), or O’Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985),
Curiel et al. (1988), and Dagan and Volij (1993) for a game theoretic approach. Also see
Thomson (1995) and Moulin (2001) for a survey.
The four most famous bankruptcy rules are the Proportional rule (that divides
the estate proportionally to the agents claims), the Constrained Equal Awards rule (that
divides the estate equally among the agents under the condition that nobody gets more
than its claim), the Constrained Equal Losses rule (that divides the difference between the
aggregate claim and the estate equally, provided no agent ends up with a negative transfer)
and the Talmud rule (that combines the principles of the three rules above and that gives
at most half of the claim to an agent when the Estate is small, at least half of the claim
when the estate is big and is equal to the Proportional rule when the estate is equal to half
of the sum of the claims). We refer to Herrero and Villar (2001) for a survey of these four
rules. Most part of the literature is devoted to characterizing these and other bankruptcy
rules by several appealing axioms. For a survey on this we refer to Thomson (1998). In
this paper we introduce a new bankruptcy rule that has important properties in common
with these four rules.
Although these rules have a long tradition in history, their axiomatizations have been
developed in the last few decades. In Herrero and Villar (2001) the four rules are evaluated
by their differences with respect to satisfying a selected set of axioms. It is known from
the literature that a solution satisfies the properties of Equal Treatment of Equals, Scale
Invariance, Composition, Path Independence and Consistency if and only if it is either the
Proportional rule or the Constrained Equal Awards rule or the Constrained Equal Losses
rule, see Moulin (2000). Further, Herrero and Villar (2001) show that from these three
solutions the Constrained Equal Awards rule is the only one that satisfies Exemption, while
1
the Constrained Equal Losses rule is the only one that satisfies Exclusion1. The Exemption
property says that small claims are not held responsible for the shortages. In contrast,
Exclusion ignores small claims. Although the principles of Exclusion and Exemption are
appealing, the specific conditions under which an agent receives its claim, respectively
nothing, seem arbitrary and are inconsistent in the sense that there is no bankruptcy
rule that satisfies both. However, we can still respect the principles of Exclusion and
Exemption but with weaker conditions under which an agent must receive its claim or
nothing. Therefore we define weak Exemption and weak Exclusion and show that there
exist solutions that satisfy both these properties. More precise, we show that there is a
unique bankruptcy rule that satisfies these two properties, together with Consistency and
Weak Proportionality (the last property saying that changing the estate always has an
effect on the payoffs of agents with higher claims that is at least as much as the effect on
payoffs of lower claim agents). This rule turns out to be the Reverse Talmud rule introduced
in Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001), see also Thomson (2008). This rule combines
the principles of the Proportional-, CEA- and CEL rules and can be seen as some kind
of counterpart of the Talmud rule. It gives the same solution as the Constrained Equal
Losses rule when the estate is small compared to the sum of the claims, the same solution
as the Constrained Equal Awards rule when the estate is large and it is again equal to the
Proportional rule when the estate is equal to half of the sum of the claims.
An important property that this Reverse Talmud rule has in common with the
Proportional rule, but is not satisfied by the Constrained Equal Awards rule nor the Con-
strained Equal Losses rule is Self-Duality, see Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001). We
show that the properties of Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion are each others dual,
and so the Reverse Talmud rule can also be characterized as the unique Self-Dual solu-
tion that satisfies Consistency, Weak Proportionality and either Weak Exemption or Weak
Exclusion.
Finally, we will also show that when we parametrize Weak Exclusion and Weak Ex-
emption, we obtain a class of bankruptcy rules, containing the Constrained Equal Awards
and Constrained Equal Losses rules as its two extreme elements and containing the Reverse
Talmud rule as some kind of compromise solution between these two rules. All solutions
in this class are CIC-rules (first Constant, then Increasing, then Constant) as considered
in Thomson (2008).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries.
In Section 3 we characterize the Reverse Talmud rule using Weak Exemption and Weak
Exclusion. In Section 4 we discuss and axiomatize the general class of bankruptcy rules.
1In fact, Herrero and Villar (2001) characterize these solutions by Path Independence, Consistency and
Exemption, respectively Composition, Consistency and Exclusion.
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Finally, Section 5 contains some concludiong remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a finite (or countably infinite) set of agents. An allocation situation is given
by a finite set N ⊂ N and an amount E ≥ 0, refered to as the estate, of a certain good
(money) to be distributed among the agents. An allocation situation is called a bank-
ruptcy situation (or a rationing problem (see e.g. Moulin (2000)), when each agent
i ∈ N has a claim ci ≥ 0 on the good such that
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E. In the sequel we denote a
bankruptcy situation by the triple (N,E, c), where c = (ci)i∈N is the collection of claims.
For given N , the collection of all bankruptcy situations (N,E, c) is denoted by BN . Further
B = ∪N⊂NBN denotes the collection of all bankruptcy situations over all populations. For
given N ⊂ N and any S ⊆ N , cS denotes the collection of claims (ci)i∈S restricted to S,
and c(S) =
∑
i∈S ci is the sum of claims of agents in S. Further we denote the aggregate
claim by C =
∑
i∈N ci and the aggregate loss by L = C − E. Note from C = L + E and
E ≥ 0, that L ≤ C, so that (N,L, c) ∈ B is the bankruptcy problem induced by (N,E, c)
in which the aggregate loss L has to be distributed among the players. For given N ⊂ N ,
an allocation x ∈ IRn assigns a payoff xi to any i ∈ N . For S ⊆ N and x ∈ IR
n, we also
denote xS = (xi)i∈S and x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. A bankruptcy rule on B is a mapping F
that assigns to every (N,E, c) ∈ B a unique allocation F (N,E, c) that is efficient and
individually non-negative and claim bounded, i.e.,
(i)
∑
i∈N Fi(N,E, c) = E,
(ii) 0 ≤ Fi(N,E, c) ≤ ci for any i ∈ N .
So, a bankruptcy rule always distributes exactly the worth of the estate such that no agent
gets less than zero or more than its claim. For given bankruptcy rule F , the dual rule
F ∗ of F , see Aumann and Maschler (1985), is obtained by distributing the aggregate loss
L = C − E among the players according to F , i.e., F ∗i (N,E, c) = ci − Fi(N,L, c), i ∈ N .
Note that F ∗ satisfies (i) and (ii), and thus also is a bankruptcy rule.
We now recall four bankruptcy rules on B with a long history of being applied in
real life situations2. For any (N,E, c), the four rules are defined as follows.
• Proportional rule P: Pi(N,E, c) =
ci
C
E, i ∈ N .
2In Herrero and Villar (2001) the first three are called the ‘three musketeers’, while the fourth rule,
introduced formally by Aumann and Maschler (1985), plays the role of the most famous fourth musketeer
D’Artagnan.
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• Constrained Equal Awards rule CEA: Let λ∗ be the solution to
∑
i∈N min[ci, λ] =
E. Then CEAi(N,E, c) = min[ci, λ
∗], i ∈ N .
• Constrained Equal Losses rule CEL: Let λ∗ be the solution to
∑
i∈N max[0, ci−
λ] = E. Then CELi(N,E, c) = max[0, ci − λ∗], i ∈ N .
• Talmud rule T: For all i ∈ N ,
Ti(N,E, c) =
{
CEAi(N,E,
1
2
c) if E ≤ 1
2
C,
ci − CEAi(N,L,
1
2
c) if E ≥ 1
2
C.
The Proportional rule distributes E proportional to the claims; the CEA rule gives to any
player the same payoff, but bounded from above by its claim; the CEL rule distributes the
aggregate loss equal among the players, but no player gets a negative payoff; and finally
the Talmud rule applies the CEA rule with half of the claims if the estate is at most half of
the aggregate claim, otherwise each player first gets its claim and then the aggregate loss
L = C − E is distributed by applying the CEA rule with half of the claims. The Talmud
rule is the extension of the so-called Contested Garment rule for two players, which can
be found already in the Talmud, to more than two players.
Recently, Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001) introduced the Reverse Talmud
rule RT, which applies the CEL rule with half of the claims if the estate is at most half of
the aggregate claim, otherwise each player first gets its claim and then the aggregate loss
L = C −E is distributed by applying the CEL rule with half of the claims.
• Reverse Talmud rule RT: For all i ∈ N ,
RTi(N,E, c) =
{
CELi(N,E,
1
2
c) if E ≤ 1
2
C,
ci − CELi(N,L,
1
2
c) if E ≥ 1
2
C.
For the two-agent problem with claims c1 < c2, the RT rule is illustrated in Figure 1.
The curve pqrs in Figure 1 shows how the payoffs depend on E. When E increases from 0
to C = c1+ c2, the corresponding payoff vectors first move from p = (0, 0) to q = (0,
c2−c1
2
),
then from q to r = (c1,
c1+c2
2
) and then from r to s = (c1, c2).
Since the CEA and CEL rule are dual to each other, i.e. CELi(N,E, c) = ci −
CEAi(N,E, c), i ∈ N , the RT rule can also be written as
RTi(N,E, c) =
{
1
2
ci − CEAi(N,
1
2
C − E, 1
2
c) if E ≤ 1
2
C,
1
2
ci + CEAi(N,E −
1
2
C, 1
2
c) if E ≥ 1
2
C,
(2.1)
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Figure 1: The RT rule for two-agent problems with c1 < c2
showing that the RT rule first assigns to each agent half of its claim and then distributes the
remaining loss or surplus according to the CEA rule with half of the claims. Observe that
analogously we obtain the Talmud rule when we distribute the remaining loss or surplus
by applying the CEL rule with half of the claims instead of the CEA rule. From this it
follows that the RT rule, like the Proportional rule and the Talmud rule, is Self-Dual, see
also Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001)3
Self-Duality SD: F (N,E, c) = F ∗(N,E, c).
The rules that we consider in this paper all satisfy the traditional property of Con-
sistency.
Consistency C: For any S ⊂ N , Fi(S,ES, cS) = Fi(N,E, c), i ∈ S, where ES =∑
i∈S Fi(N,E, c).
In the literature several axiomatic characterizations of the Proportional, CEA, CEL
and Talmud rule can be found. In this paper we are, in particular, interested in the so-called
Exemption and Exclusion properties introduced by Herrero and Villar (2001). Exemption
states that an agent whose claim is at most equal to the Estate divided by the number of
agents earns it claim, while Exclusion states that an agent whose claim is at most equal to
the aggregate loss divided by the number of agents earns nothing. Let n = |N | denote the
cardinality of N .
3In fact, Thomson (2008) shows that the RT rule is the only self-dual CIC-rule, see also Section 4.
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Reverse Talmud rule Talmud rule
c1 = 100 c2 = 200 c3 = 300 c1 = 100 c2 = 200 c3 = 300
E = 100 0 25 75 331
3
331
3
331
3
E = 200 162
3
662
3
1162
3
50 75 75
E = 300 50 100 150 50 100 150
E = 400 831
3
1331
3
1831
3
50 125 225
E = 500 100 175 225 662
3
1662
3
2662
3
CEA rule CEL rule
c1 = 100 c2 = 200 c3 = 300 c1 = 100 c2 = 200 c3 = 300
E = 100 331
3
331
3
331
3
0 0 100
E = 200 662
3
662
3
662
3
0 50 150
E = 300 100 100 100 0 100 200
E = 400 100 150 150 331
3
1331
3
2331
3
E = 500 100 200 200 662
3
1662
3
2662
3
Table 1: T-, RT-, CEA- and CEL-rule applied to Example 2.1
Exemption Exe: For all i ∈ N , Fi(N,E, c) = ci if ci ≤
1
n
E.
Exclusion Exc: For all i ∈ N , Fi(N,E, c) = 0 if ci ≤
1
n
L.
In this paper we consider a class of bankruptcy rules that contains the CEA and CEL
rule as extreme elements, and the RT rule somehow ‘in the middle’. Within this class the
CEA rule is the only one that satisfies Exemption, while the CEL rule is the only one that
satisfies Exclusion.
We end these preliminaries with an example.
Example 2.1 We consider the well-known three-agent example from the Talmud with
claims 100, 200 and 300 and compute the outcome according to the Reverse Talmud-,
Talmud-, CEA- and CEL rules for estates verying from 100 to 500. The outcomes are
given in the Table 1. In this table the rows correspond to different values of the Estate,
while the columns correspond to the claims of the agents.
3 Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion
Although the two principles of Exemption and Exclusion are appealing, the specific bounds
under which they hold seem rather arbitrary and have some problems. Both principles are
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applied in real life bankruptcy situations. The Exemption property says that small claims
are not held responsible for the shortages. When an agent has a claim that is smaller than
what should be received when the estate E is equally divided between the claimants, then
the agent should be granted its full claim. From the viewpoint of distributing aggregate
losses, i.e., the agents are first awarded their full claim and then are taxed to pay for the
aggregate loss, Exemption reflects the general principle of progressive taxation: agents with
small claims don’t have to contribute in sharing the aggregate loss. In contrast, Exclusion
ignores small claims. When an agent has a claim that is smaller than the average loss
1
n
L, then the claim is disregarded and the agent gets nothing. From the viewpoint of
distributing aggregate losses, Exclusion reflects the general principle of degressive taxation:
small claims are fully taxed away, whereas bigger claims are partially granted.
Although both principles seem appealing, a main problem is that there is no rule
that can satisfy the principles of Exemption and Exclusion simultaneously. Clearly, for
instance when C = 2E, we have L = E and for ci ≤
1
n
E = 1
n
L the two principles require
simultaneously that Fi(N,E, c) = ci and Fi(N,E, c) = 0, which is contradictory. However,
this is not due to the principles of Exemption and Exclusion, but is caused by what are
considered to be ‘small’ claims in relation to the size of the estate.
The main motivation of this paper is to give a rule that simultaneously satisfies a
type of Exemption and a type of Exclusion property. This rule has the property that small
claims are fully awarded when the estate is large, whereas small claims are fully ignored
when the estate is small. We call these properties Weak Exemption and Weak Exclu-
sion. They say that the claim of agent i is fully awarded when ci ≤
E−L
n
, while the claim
is fully ignored when ci ≤
L−E
n
. Observe that E − L ≥ 0 if and only if E ≥ 1
2
C.
11. Weak Exemption W-Exe: For all i ∈ N , Fi(N,E, c) = ci if ci ≤
E−L
n
.
12. Weak Exclusion W-Exc: For all i ∈ N , Fi(N,E, c) = 0 if ci ≤
L−E
n
.
Since E − L ≤ E and L − E ≤ L, the range of claims for which Weak Exemption (re-
spectively Weak Exclusion) requires the agent to be allocated its claim (respectively zero)
is smaller then those for which this is required under Exemption (respectively Exclusion).
Thus, Exemption (respectively Exclusion) implies Weak Exemption (respectively Weak
Exclusion). Observe that when E = L, the two properties do not require anything.
Note that none of the four classical bankruptcy rules (P, CEA, CEL and T) satisfy
both Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion. However, it turns out that the RT rule satisfies
these two properties.
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Lemma 3.1 The Reverse Talmud rule on B satisfies Weak Exemption and Weak Exclu-
sion.
Proof. First, consider the case that E − L ≥ 0 and thus E ≥ 1
2
C. Then RTi(N,E, c) =
1
2
ci + CEAi(N,E −
1
2
C, 1
2
c). If ci ≤
E−L
n
= 2E−C
n
, then ci
2
≤
E− 1
2
C
n
and we have that
CEAi(N,E −
1
2
C, 1
2
c) = 1
2
ci. Hence RTi(N,E, c) = ci.
Similarly, when E − L ≤ 0 and thus E ≤ 1
2
C, we have that RTi(N,E, c) =
1
2
ci −
CEAi(N,
1
2
C−E, 1
2
c). If ci ≤
L−E
n
= C−2E
n
, then ci
2
≤
1
2
C−E
n
and thus CEAi(N,
1
2
C−E, 1
2
c) =
1
2
ci. Hence RTi(N,E, c) = 0. 
To give a full characterization of the Reverse Talmud rule, we now state one more
property, to be called Weak Proportionality which says that when the estate becomes
larger, the increase in the payoffs of the players is nondecreasing in the size of the claims: a
player with a bigger claim receives at least the same of the additional amount of the estate
as a player with a smaller claim.
13. Weak Proportionality WP: For i, j ∈ N with ci ≥ cj it holds that Fi(N,E′, c) −
Fi(N,E, c) ≥ Fj(N,E′, c)− Fj(N,E, c) for every E and E′ such that E′ > E.
Note that WP of a bankruptcy rule implies Claim Monotonicity saying that agents with
higher claims get at least as much than agents with smaller claims, i.e. Fi(N,E, c) ≥
Fj(N,E, c) if ci ≥ cj .
Lemma 3.2 The Reverse Talmud rule on B satisfies Weak Proportionality.
Proof. The RT solution first awards each agent half of its claim and then the remaining
Loss or Surplus |E − 1
2
C| is distributed according to the CEA rule with half of the claims.
It is easy to verify that the CEA rule satisfies Weak Proportionality. Indeed, two players
i and j receive the same additional payoff when the claim increases from E to E′ if both
still do not obtain their full payoff at E′. Otherwise the agent with the bigger claim gets
at least the same additional payoff as the agent with the smaller claim.
We now consider three cases for the RT rule. For two agents i and j, suppose that
ci ≥ cj . When both E and E′ are smaller than half of the aggregate claim C, then it
follows from the Weak Proportionality of the CEA rule that agent i faces at least the same
additional loss as agent j when the estate decreases from E ′ to E. Similarly, when both
E and E′ are larger than half of the aggregate claim, then agent i faces at least the same
additional payoff as agent j when the estate increases from E to E′. Finally, when E is at
most half of the aggregate claim and E ′ is at least half of the aggregate claim, then, first,
agent i faces at least the same additional loss as agent j when the estate decreases from
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1
2
C to E and, second, agent i receives at least the same additional payoff as agent j when
the estate increases from 1
2
C to E′. 
We now come to the main theorem which characterizes the RT rule.
Theorem 3.3 The Reverse Talmud rule is the unique rule on B that satisfies Weak Ex-
emption, Weak Exclusion, Consistency and Weak Proportionality.
Proof. From the Lemma’s 3.1 and 3.2 we have that the RT rule satisfies Weak Exemption
and Weak Exclusion. Consistency is shown in Thomson (2008). It remains to show that
the four properties uniquely determine the outcome.
Let N ⊂ N . Without loss of generality we number the agents in N from 1 to n,
i.e. N = {1, . . . , n}, and withhout loss of generality we assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn.
Let x ∈ IRn denote the vector of payoffs assigned by the RT rule. For n = 1, by definition
the only rule is to assign E fully to the single player in N , i.e., x1 = E. Next we consider
n = 2. Define E0 = −1
2
c1 +
1
2
c2 and E
1 = 3
2
c1 +
1
2
c2. Observe E
0 ≥ 0 and E1 ≤ C. We
distinguish three cases. First consider the case that E ≤ E0. This yields c1 ≤ c2− 2E and
thus 2c1 ≤ c1 + c2 − 2E = C − 2E = L− E. Hence Weak Exclusion implies that x1 = 0,
x2 = E and thus the payoffs are uniquely determined. The second case is E ≥ E1. This
yields 3c1 ≤ 2E − c2 and thus 2c1 ≤ 2E − (c1 + c2) = 2E − C = E − L. Hence Weak
Exemption implies that x1 = c1, x2 = E−c1 and again the payoffs are uniquely determined.
It remains to consider the case E0 ≤ E ≤ E1. We have seen that x01 = 0, x
0
2 = E
0 are the
payoffs at E = E0 and x11 = c1, x
1
2 = E
1 − c1 are the payoffs at E = E1. So, when E goes
from E0 to E1, the payoff of agent 1 increases from x01 = 0 to x
1
1 = c1 and the payoff of
agent 2 increases from x02 = E
0 = −1
2
c1 +
1
2
c2 to x
1
2 = E
1 − c1 =
1
2
c1 +
1
2
c2. So, when E
goes from E0 to E1, the increase in both payoffs is equal to c1. Weak Proportionality now
requires that for any E between E0 and E1, x1 = x
0
1+
1
2
(E−E0) and x2 = x02+
1
2
(E−E0).
Hence for any E the payoffs are uniquely determined when n = 2.
For n ≥ 2, we now proceed by induction. Suppose that the payoffs are uniquely
determined when the number of agents is at most n − 1. Define E0 = C
2
− nc1
2
≥ 0 and
E1 = C
2
+ nc1
2
≤ C. We distinguish three similar cases as for n = 2. First consider the case
that E ≤ E0 = C
2
− nc1
2
. This yields nc1 ≤ C − 2E = L− E and Weak Exclusion implies
that x1 = 0 and so that
∑n
i=2 Fi(N,E, c) = E. Then x2, . . . , xn follow from Consistency
and the induction hypothesis (i.e. the four properties uniquely determine the payoffs when
the number of agents is equal to n− 1.). Hence the payoffs are uniquely determined. The
second case is E ≥ E1. This yields nc1 ≤ 2E − C = E − L and Weak Exemption implies
that x1 = c1 and so
∑n
i=2 Fi(N,E, c) = E − c1. Again x2, . . . , xn are uniquely determined
by Consistency and the induction hypothesis. It remains to consider the case E0 ≤ E ≤ E1.
Let x0 ∈ IRn be the uniquely determined vector of payoffs at E0 and x1 ∈ IRn at E1. It
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holds that x01 = 0 and x
1
1 = c1. Further E
1 − E0 = nc1. So, when E goes from E
0 to E1,
the total payoff increases with nc1, whereas the payoff of the smallest claim increases from
0 to c1. Weak Proportionality now requires that the change in payoff for all agents should
be the same, and thus for any E between E0 and E1, xi = x
0
i +
1
n
(E − E0) for all i ∈ N .
Hence for any E the payoffs are uniquely determined. 
Realizing that Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion are dual to each other, one
obtains immediately another characterization of the RT-rule. A property P ∗ is the dual of
a property P if for any rule F : F satisfies property P if and only if its dual F ∗ satisfies
property P ∗.
Lemma 3.4 The properties of Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion are dual to each
other.
Proof. Let F be a bankruptcy rule. Then [F ∗ satisfies Weak Exclusion] if and only if
[ci ≤
L−E
n
⇒ F ∗i (N,E, c) = 0] if and only if [ci ≤
L−E
n
⇒ ci−Fi(N,L, c) = 0] if and only if
[ci ≤
L−E
n
⇒ Fi(N,L, c) = ci] if and only if [F satisfies Weak Excemption]. For the latter
assertion, recall that E + L = C. So when applying the bankruptcy rule F to L we have
that the loss is given by E = C −L and the condition for Weak Excemption becomes that
ci ≤
L−E
n
. 
Herrero and Villar (2001) already mention that the properties of Exemption and
Exclusion are each other’s dual. Since there does not exist a rule that satisfies both,
it follows that there does not exist a rule F that is Self-Dual and satisfies Exemption.
Also, there does not exist a rule F that is Self-Dual and satisfies Exclusion. Contrary to
Exemption and Exclusion, we have seen above that there do exist solutions that satisfy
both weak versions of these properties, such as the Reverse Talmud rule. Since F being
Self-Dual and satisfying a property P , implies that it also satisfies property P ∗, the next
corollary follows immediately from Theorem 3.3, Lemma 3.4 and the Reverse Talmud rule
satisfying Self-Duality.
Corollary 3.5 The Reverse Talmud rule is the unique rule on B that satisfies Weak Ex-
emption, Self-Duality, Consistency and Weak Proportionality. Also the Reverse Talmud
rule is the unique rule on B that satisfies Weak Exclusion, Self-Duality, Consistency and
Weak Proportionality.
4 A class of bankruptcy rules
Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006) generalize the Talmud rule to a class of bankruptcy rules
that contains the CEA rule and the CEL rule as special (extreme) cases. In this section
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we generalize the RT rule to a class of rules by parametrizing the properties of Exemption
and Exclusion for α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Also this class contains the CEA rule and the CEL rule as
two extreme cases.
11. α-Exemption α-Exe: For all i ∈ N , Fi(N,E, c) = ci if αci ≤
E−(1−α)C
n
.
12. β-Exclusion β-Exc: For all i ∈ N , Fi(N,E, c) = 0 if βci ≤
βC−E
n
.
Observe that for α = β = 1 we have Exemption and Exclusion and that for α = β = 1
2
we have Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion. As we remarked before, a bankruptcy rule
cannot satisfy both properties for α = β = 1, but the RT rule satisfies both properties for
α = β = 1
2
. In fact, one can verify that there always exist bankruptcy rules that satisfy
α-Exe and β-Exc if α + β = 1, i.e. if β = 1 − α. Similar as the proof of Theorem 3.3
one can show that there always is a unique bankruptcy rule that satisfies these properties
together with Consistency and Weak Proportionality.
Theorem 4.1 For any α ∈ [0, 1] there is a unique rule on B that satisfies (1 − α)-
Exemption, α-Exclusion, Consistency and Weak Proportionality. For all i ∈ N , this rule
is given by
Tαi (N,E, c) =
{
CELi(N,E,αc) if E ≤ αC,
ci − CELi(N,L, (1− α)c) if E ≥ αC.
Proof. The proof of this theorem goes along similar lines as the the proofs of correspond-
ing results in the previous section and is therefore omitted. 
Clearly, the class described in Theorem 4.1 contains the CEA rule (for α = 0), the CEL
rule (for α = 1) and the RT rule (for α = 1
2
). Note also that the RT rule is the unique
Self-Dual rule in this class. Also note that this class is closed under Self-Duality in the
sense that if a rule F belongs to this class, then also its dual rule belongs to this class. More
precisely, the dual rule of Tα is T 1−α, α ∈ [0, 1]. Further, we remark that all these rules
are CIC rules as considered in Thomson (2008). According to these rules, when the Estate
increases starting at zero, the payoff of any agent i first is constant (at zero) upto some
Estate level ai (possibly 0) then increases upto the claim level ci and from there is constant
at the claim level. Moreover, if for some agents the payoff increases when the Estate goes
from E to E′ then the payoffs for all these agents increase by the same amount. Obviously,
if there are two agents then the class of CIC rules and the class of Tα rules coincide since
by α-Exclusion the payoff of the small claimant, say claimant 1, is constant at zero upto
11
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Figure 2: The class Tα for two-agent problems with c1 < c2
Estate level α(c2 − c1), while by (1− α)-Exemption it must be equal to the claim c1 if the
Estate is more than α(c2− c1) + 2c1. But this implies that between these two Estate levels
the payoffs of both agents increase by the same amount. However, if there are more than
two agents, then not all CIC rules are Tα rules.
For two agent problems the class is illustrated in Figure 2. The curve prs shows
how the payoffs depend on E for the CEA rule and the curve pqs for the CEL rule.
For 0 < α < 1, the curve of payoff vectors first goes from p in the direction of q, then
somewhere between p and q it moves from the boundary x1 = 0 upwards under 45 degrees
to the boundary x1 = c1 and then it moves to the point s.
Besides the properties mentioned in Theorem 4.1 the rules Tα, α ∈ [0, 1] are
parametric4 and satisfy other traditional properties such as Equal Treatment of Eequals5,
Continuity6,7 (see Thomson (2008)) and Scale Invariance8.
4A bankruptcy rule is parametric if there exists a function f : [a, b] × IR+ → IR+, where [a, b] ⊂
IR ∪ {−∞,+∞}, such that f is continuous and weakly monotonic in its first argument, such that (i)
Fi(N,E, c) = f(λ, ci) for all (N,E, c) ∈ B and for some λ ∈ [a, b], (ii) f(a, x) = 0, for all x ∈ IR+, and (iii)
f(b, x) = x, for all x ∈ IR+.
5A bankruptcy rule satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals if for all i, j ∈ N , Fi(N,E, c) = Fj(N,E, c) if
ci = cj .
6A bankruptcy rule satisfies Continuity (on E) ifn for all sequences of problems (N,El, c) such that
El → E, it holds that F (N,El, c)→ F (N,E, c).
7Note that from Young (1987) it follows that a bankruptcy rule satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals,
Continuity and Consistency if and only if it is Parametric.
8A bankruptcy rule satisfies Scale Invariance if for all λ > 0, Fi(N,λE,λc) = λFi(N,E, c), i ∈ N .
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5 Concluding remarks
The properties of Exemption (satisfied by the CEA rule) and Exclusion (satisfied by the
CEL rule) for bankruptcy rules have as major disadvantage that there is no bankruptcy
rule that satisfies both properties, although the principles behind both properties seem
reasonable. But the bounds on the claims under which these properties require that an
agent gets its claim, respectively gets zero, seem rather arbitrary. Therefore we weakened
these bounds in a very natural way by replacing the worth of the Estate (respectively Loss)
by the difference between the Estate and the Loss (respectively the difference between the
Loss and the Estate). It turned out that there is a unique bankruptcy rule satisfying
these weaker properties together with Consistency and Weak Proportionality which is
the Reverse Talmud rule. Moreover, this rule is characterized by Self-Duality, Consistency,
Weak Proportionality and either Weak Exemption or Weak Exclusion. We also generalized
this Reverse Talmud rule by parametrizing the properties of Weak Exemption and Weak
Exclusion, obtaining a class of bankruptcy rules that contains the CEA rule and the CEL
rule as extreme cases, and are all CIC rules as considered in Thomson (2008).
In order to compare the new rules with the four classic rules (CEA, CEL, Pro-
portional and Talmud rule) we conclude by recalling some known characterizations as
summarized by Herrero and Villar (2001). Moulin (2000) showed that a rule satisfies the
axioms ETE, SI, C, Composition (Comp)9 and Path independence (PI)10 if and only if it
is the P, CEA or CEL bankruptcy rule. It follows from Young (1988) that P is the unique
rule satisfying ETE, Comp, C and SD.11 Besides the characterization of the CEA rule by
PI, C and Exe, it follows from Dagan (1996) that the CEA rule is also the unique rule
satisfying ETE, Comp, C and Independence of Claims Truncation (ICT).12 Besides being
the only rule satisfying Comp, C and Excl, it follows from Dagan (1996) that the CEL
rule is characterized by ETE, PI, Cons and Composition from Minimal Rights (CMR).13
Finally, the Talmud rule is characterized by C, ICT and CMR. It is also characterized
by C, CMR and SD. From the properties mentioned above, the RT rule does not satisfy
9A bankruptcy rule satisfies Composition if Fi(N,E1+E2, c) = Fi(N,E1, c)+Fi(N,E2, c−F (N,E1, c))
for all i ∈ N , E1, E2 ≥ 0 and C ≥ E1 +E2.
10A bankruptcy rule satisfies Path Independence if Fi(N,E1, c) = Fi(N,E1, F (N,E1 + E2, c)) for all
i ∈ N , E1, E2 ≥ 0 and C ≥ E1 +E2.
11Young (1988) showed that on a fixed set of agents P is characterized by ETE, Comp and SD.
12A bankruptcy rule satisfies Independence of Claims Truncation if Fi(N,E, c˜) = Fi(N,E, c), where
c˜i = min[ci, E], for all i ∈ N . Dagan (1996) shows that on a fixed set of agents CEA is characterized by
ETE, Comp and ICT.
13A bankruptcy rule satisfies Composition fromMinimal Rights if Fi(N,E, c) = mi(N,E, c)+Fi(N,E, c),
wheremi(N,E, c) = max[0, E−
∑
j =i cj ], i ∈ N , E = E−
∑
i∈N mi(N,E, c) and ci = ci−mi(N,E, c), i ∈
N . Dagan (1996) shows that on a fixed set of agents CEL is characterized by ETE, PI and CMR.
13
Comp, PI, ICT and CMR.
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